We construct a model of redistributive politics where the central government is opportunistic and uses its discretion to make transfers to state governments on the basis of political considerations. These considerations are the alignment between the incumbent parties at the central and state levels and whether a state is a swing state or not. A testable prediction from the model is that a state that is both swing and aligned with the central government is especially likely to receive higher transfers. We test this prediction using Indian data for 14 states from 1974-75 to 1996-97. We …nd that a state which is both aligned and swing in the last state election is estimated to receive 16% higher transfers than a state which is unaligned and non-swing. JEL Classi…cation: C72, D72
Introduction
The allocation of grants (i.e transfers) from central to sub-national governments has always been an important issue of …scal federalism. Central government grants help to break the linkage between revenue and expenditure assignments by levels of government and permit the center to pursue various objectives. While the traditional literature on …scal federalism discusses these objectives from alternative perspectives, it assumes that the central government is a "benevolent planner," interested in maximizing social welfare.
The recent literature on political economy emphasizes the institutional constraints and rigidities under which policies are formulated. In particular, policymakers are typically political parties or politicians, who may be opportunistic and implement policies so as to maximize their chances of re-election, or be partisan and so want to further the interests of their own support groups. Of course, the pattern of transfers implemented by a benevolent government will typically be very di¤erent from those followed by opportunistic or partisan governments. While there are a number of theoretical and empirical models of opportunistic governments proposed in the literature, the diverse nature of political variables that are used to proxy the theoretical variables makes it important to test the theory in di¤erent settings. Our paper is a contribution in this direction -we focus on a developing country, India.
Speci…cally, we study the hypothesis that the central government transfers to state governments in India are motivated by political considerations. Our theoretical framework explicitly incorporates the fact that di¤erent political parties may be in control of governments at different levels. This is important since the state government stands "between" the central government and the voters in the state. Central grants relax the budget constraints of state governments and permit the state governments to increase their expenditure. To the extent that voters in the state are unsure about how the additional expenditure is …nanced, the ruling party in the state also bene…ts from increased central grants.
We assume that central grants are used to …nance public projects in the states and that they generate goodwill amongst voters for the ruling party at the center. However, since these grants improve the welfare of the state population, the incumbent in the state also reaps some of the bene…ts. Of course, if the incumbent in the state and the center happens to be the same party (i.e. the state government is aligned with the central government), then that party derives the entire (electoral) bene…t of any additional expenditure in the state. On the other hand, if say party L is in power at the center and party R is in power in state s, then some of the electoral bene…ts of additional expenditure in state s "leaks" to party R. This gives party L less of an incentive to give grants to this state.
The central incumbent party in our model seeks to maximize its expected vote share across states. Given this objective, it follows that the central incumbent (and, hence, central grants) will be especially biased in favor of states that are simultaneously aligned and relatively more swing. 1 We call this the Aligned Swing e¤ect. However, the swing factor may work very di¤erently amongst those states which are ruled by the opposition party. Such swing states may actually be discriminated against since some of the goodwill leaks to the party in power at the state and this leakage is costlier if the vote share of the state incumbent rises sharply as a consequence.
We then use the model to analyze the political economy of center-state discretionary transfers in India. 2 The data provide strong support for the hypothesis that aligned swing states receive higher grants than all other state types.
Our paper is not the …rst to study such issues: Cox and McCubbins (1986) , Dixit and Londregan (1996) (henceforth DL), and Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) (henceforth LW) construct theoretical models of tactical redistribution which describe how political parties design their policy platforms in order to further their electoral goals. DL assume that parties design tactical redistribution programs in order to maximize their (expected) vote share while LW also consider the case where each party's objective is to maximize the probability of winning a majority of the seats. These di¤erences in objectives may matter when the prior distribution of support for the two parties is not symmetric (LW).
Our model di¤ers from the aforementioned papers in two ways. First, both DL and LW discuss competition between two symmetric parties in campaign promises at one level of government. In contrast, we emphasize the presence of an asymmetry due to incumbencyspeci…cally, the role of the incumbent party is highlighted whereas the role of the challenger party is suppressed. Second, we assume that there are two levels of government, center and state. The latter feature has more in common with DL (1998). However, our baseline model assumes that voters vote on party lines and do not distinguish between the two levels of government while the focus of DL (1998) is on the issue of divided government. Moreover, DL (1998) assume a symmetric role of state and central governments in redistribution and maintain the assumption of two symmetric parties at each level of government. Our focus on incumbency induced asymmetry allows us to derive the Aligned Swing e¤ect, which is novel to this literature. 3 Drawing on ideas in DL and LW, a small but growing literature has tested whether variations in central transfers to sub-national units can be accounted for by swing and alignment variables entered separately. Using data on social assistance block grants from the central government to communes in Albania, Case (2001) , for example, tests the empirical validity of the predictions implied by the two political objective functions outlined by LW. She concludes that politics does matter in determining the pattern of block grants; in particular, swing communes get higher block grants. Johansson (2003) analyzes data on grants from the central government to the municipalities in Sweden and …nds limited support for the hypothesis that intergovernmental grants are in ‡uenced by whether the municipality is swing or not. Our paper contributes to this literature by showing the empirical relevance of the interaction e¤ects of the swing and alignment variables for the case of India. 4 2 A part of central grants to states in India is governed by explicit formulas. Discretionary grants refer to the part of central grants which is not governed by these formulas. See Section 3 for details. 3 All the other models in the literature treat parties as symmetric, an assumption more suited to campaign spending than grants, although Snyder (1989) discusses asymmetry between parties in general. Dasgupta et al (2000) (the earliest version of this paper), was the …rst to introduce the asymmetry due to incumbency, and show the empirical relevance of the Aligned Swing e¤ect (an alignment-swing interaction) in explaining central transfers in India. 4 Two related papers that use Indian data are Rao and Singh (2001) and Khemani (2007) . Using di¤erent transfer variables they both test a bargaining model where alignment and the lobbying power of states are the The plan of the paper is the following. In section 2, we present the theoretical model while Section 3 contains some institutional details. Section 4 describes the data. Sections 5 and 6 contain the empirical results. Section 7 provides some concluding remarks while the last section is the Data Appendix.
Theoretical Framework
In this section, we build on the DL and LW models of electoral competition to show how the incumbent party at the center can use center-state transfers to promote its electoral prospects by spreading goodwill among voters for the incumbent party at the center. There are two parties, L and R, and two levels of government: center and state. The central incumbent party (assumed to be L) may be interested in promoting the interests of the party at the state level since a stronger state-level party is more likely to result in better performance in the central elections in that state, but may also be interested in re-election at the central level. It is possible therefore for the central incumbent party to have di¤erent objective functions based on whether re-election is at the central or the state level. Our benchmark model focuses on the …rst case where the central incumbent party is interested in promoting the interests of the (L) party at the state level. We then show that under some assumptions, the predictions are consistent with a central incumbent party which is interested in maximizing its electoral prospects in the central level re-election.
Benchmark model
Electoral competition takes place between two parties, L and R, at the state level. The central incumbent is assumed to be interested in promoting the interests of the party at the state level. Without loss of generality, let party L be the incumbent at the center. Let S L be the set of states where the incumbent party is L, while S R is the set of states where R is the incumbent.
Transfers from the center to each state s are used to …nance development projects in the state. These projects increase state incomes, and so the transfers generate some goodwill amongst voters in the state. Since these grants are channelled through the state governments (which also implement the projects), voters cannot perceive perfectly that it is the central government (and therefore the L party) which is the source of a grant. Hence, the goodwill generated by these grants is shared by both tiers of government, or more precisely, by the incumbent parties at the two levels of government. Let 2 [0; 1]. Then, represents the share of the goodwill from per capita transfers that accrues to the central incumbent. The variable is known by the central incumbent and assumed to be exogenous in our model. It captures the degree to which voters are aware of the source of a grant: e.g., is likely to be high if a project is named after the Prime Minister or if voters are politically aware. 5 Of course, if main independent variables. 5 Is the central incumbent capable of attracting all of the goodwill generated by the central plan and centrally sponsored schemes that it launches? For some schemes -with names like Rajiv Gandhi (a prominent Congress Party prime minister) or Pradhan Mantri (Prime Minister) in front of the scheme title -it is easy to deduce party L is in power in the state then party L receives the entire goodwill (shared between the party at the center and at the state).
Within each state s, there is a continuum of voters of mass N s who may di¤er in their ideologies. A voter j located at X j on the ideology spectrum [X; X] has preference X j for party R over party L. X j is private information while the cumulative distribution function of X in state s, denoted s (:), is common knowledge. We assume that the p.d.f. 0 s (X) is strictly positive and continuous for all X 2 [X; X]: To simplify notation, we assume that X = X, so that the midpoint is 0.
Voters in each state vote on the basis of two criteria: ideology and the amount of goodwill received by the parties. Consider a state s 2 S L which has received a per capita grant of g s from the center and let voter j in state s be located at X j on the ideology spectrum. Noting that party L has received a total goodwill of U (g s ), with U (0) = 0; U 0 (g s ) > 0; U 00 (g s ) < 0; he votes for the L party if:
and he votes for party R otherwise. On the other hand, if s 2 S R , then party R (being the incumbent at the state level) gets a share of the goodwill (1 )U (g s ) while party L at the center gets only U (g s ): Hence voter j will vote for the L party i¤:
The inequalities (1) and (2) generate cut-points, X(g s ; L) and X(g s ; ; R), for each state such that for k = L; R, a voter located at X j in state s 2 S k votes for the L party i¤ X j X(g s ; ; k). Note that does not matter for the cut-point of an L state since voting is on party lines regardless of the level of the party. It follows that:
The central incumbent engages in tactical redistribution of grants in order to in ‡uence the location of the cut-points X( ; L) and X( ; R) among states. Notice that given equation (3) , any increase in g s leads to a rightward shift in X( ; L). In other words, an increase in g s to a state s 2 S L has an unambiguous e¤ect -it improves the electoral prospect of party L. The e¤ect of an increase in g s when s 2 S R is ambiguous. Suppose is less than half. Then, more goodwill accrues to party R which is the incumbent in the state than to party L, the incumbent at the center. In this case, party R bene…ts more than party L. However, if exceeds half, then the incumbent at the center receives a higher share of the goodwill, and this results in a rightward shift in the cut-point, a shift that is smaller in magnitude than for an L state as long as < 1 (see equation (3)).
We assume that the tactical redistribution program of the central incumbent is subject to two constraints. First, the total transfers must satisfy an overall budget constraint. Second, where the money comes from. But, not all schemes are of this type; Saxena and Ravi (2006, p. 3-4) , for example, review the performance of selected anti-poverty schemes and highlight the confusion that results from complicated scheme titles that keep changing as well. Our center-state grants data sums up central funding over all central plan and centrally sponsored schemes; so, an assumption of "goodwill leakages" ( < 1 in our theoretical model) is not unreasonable. the central incumbent is also interested in maximizing total welfare accruing from grants. We capture this aspect by specifying a function (g s ), where (:) is the per capita welfare. We assume that is increasing and concave in g s .
In the benchmark model, where the center cares about helping the party at the state level, a plausible objective of the central incumbent is to maximize the vote shares across states (or equivalently, maximize a weighted sum of the probability of winning each state):
The central incumbent then maximizes its objective function subject to the budget constraint:
by choice of grant allocation, g s . We assume that the central incumbent's problem has an interior solution. Assumption 1 below ensures that the solution is a global maximum. The …rst-order condition for a state s 2 S L is:
and for a state s 2 S R :
where denotes the Lagrange multiplier and g s is the allocation of grants to state s that is optimal for the central incumbent, L.
Before discussing the implications of equations (6) and (7), we consider the following situation. Suppose state s does not receive any grant from the central incumbent. With g s set equal to 0, notice that the cut-point in state s is pegged at 0. We interpret the density at the cut-point 0, 0 s (0), to be a measure of how swing state s is. For example, if state s has a higher density than state l at the cut-point 0 -i.e., 0 s (0) > 0 l (0) -then this is interpreted as saying that relative to state l, state s has a higher proportion of voters who are not ideologically attached to either party (" ‡oating voters" or "independents") and hence is more swing.
Our theoretical propositions relate variations in grant levels across states to variations in states' swing and variations in states' alignment with the central incumbent. However, we need some further notation and extra assumptions in order to state the propositions formally. Consider two states s; l and assume w.l.o.g. that 0
. Let x sl be the …rst crossing point to the right of zero for the two p.d.f.s 0 s ; 0 l ; let x sl be the …rst crossing point to the left of zero for the two p.d.f.s 0 s ; 0 l . 6 Given x sl , g sl is de…ned to be the grant level such that X( g sl ; L) = x sl ; given x sl and < 1 2 , g sl ( ) is de…ned to be the grant level such that X(g sl ( ); ; R) = x sl . So, the grant level g sl ensures that the resulting cut-point is x sl ; the grant level g sl ( ) ensures that the resulting cut-point is x sl :
When state s 2 S k ; k = L; R; receives grant g from the central incumbent, let V s (g; ; k) denote the per person contribution of the state to the objective function of the central incumbent, given in equation (4) . Thus, for state s 2 S L , V s (g; ; L) is equal to (g) + s (X (g; L)); for state s 2 S R ; V s (g; ; R) is equal to (g) + s (X (g; ; R)). We will assume that the functions fV s (g; ; k)g s2S k ; k = L; R; are concave in g.
Assumption 1: For all states s 2 S k ; k = L; R; V s (g; ; k) is concave in g. 7 Recall that fg s g s2S is the allocation of grants that is optimal for the central incumbent, L. Proposition 1 considers the case wherein 1 2 (goodwill leakages are "large") and shows that, regardless of cut-point densities, states that are unaligned with the central incumbent receive lower grants than states that are aligned. This is called the Alignment E¤ ect, and it arises only because in our model the role of incumbent parties is di¤erent from challenger parties, in that state incumbents are able to reap the bene…ts of grants coming from the central government since voters are not able to distinguish the source of the grants.
Proof The …rst-order condition for state s 2 S L is given in equation (6) and the …rst-order condition for state l 2 S R is given in equation (7). Thus,
Recall that we have assumed that 0 s (X) and 0 l (X) are strictly positive for all X 2 [X; X]: Hence,
is strictly less than 0. Thus, g s > g l follows from the concavity of (:).
Consider now a comparison of two states that are both unaligned with the central incumbent. Assuming that equilibrium grants are "small", Proposition 2 shows that determines whether the more swing of the two states is favored or discriminated against by the central incumbent. For concreteness, consider two unaligned states s; l 2 S R and assume that 0 s (0) exceeds 0 l (0) (i.e., state s is more swing than state l). Also, let < 1 2 . In this case, the relatively more swing state, s, receives lower grants than state l. The intuition behind this result is that when voters are unable to distinguish the source of the grants, the credit may go to the state incumbent instead of the central incumbent. Anticipating this, the central incumbent will discriminate against states that are likely to swing the election in the wrong direction. If, on the other hand, > 1 2 , then grant levels are such that g s > g l : We refer to the swing-interaction in the determination of grants for unaligned states as the Unaligned Swing E¤ ect.
and < 1=2, concavity of s(X ) in X does not ensure that Assumption 1 holds. However, the assumption will be satis…ed if is su¢ ciently concave.
Proposition 2 Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Consider two states s; l 2 S R with 0
and 0 < g s ; g l < g sl . However, if < 1 2 and g s ; g l < g sl ( ), then this conclusion is reversed. 8 Proof The …rst-order conditions for states s; l 2 S R can be written as follows:
Concavity of V s (:) and V l (:) in g ensures that g s > g l when g s ; g l < g sl if the …rst-order condition is to be satis…ed. Now consider the case when < 1 2 . Observe that if g < g sl ( ), then @V s (g; ; R)=@g s < @V l (g; ; R)=@g l because (2 1)U 0 (g) < 0 and 0 s (X (g; ; R)) > 0 l (X (g; ; R)). The proposition follows from the concavity of V s (:) and V l (:) in g.
We next contrast two states that are both aligned with the central incumbent. Proposition 3 states that so long as equilibrium grants are "small", the state which is more swing receives higher central grants than the state which is less swing. 
Proof
The …rst-order conditions of states s; l 2 S L can be written as follows:
…rst-order condition is to be satis…ed.
Consider now two states, s and l, where state s is aligned with the central incumbent and more swing than state l. Proposition 1 demonstrates that if state l is unaligned with the central incumbent and , grants to state s; l 2 S R do not a¤ect the two cut-points, which are …xed at 0. Hence, the …rst-order conditions for the two states are 0 (g s ) = and 0 (g l ) = ; i.e., g s = g l .
would continue to favor state s relative to state l even when > 1 2 . A formal result to this e¤ect can be derived once Assumption 2 is invoked.
Assumption 2: Consider any two states s; l such that s 2 S L ; l 2 S R and 0
Proposition 4 Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Consider two states, (11) and (12)).
Observe
and Assumption 2 holds.
We have therefore established that @V s (g; ; L)=@g s > @V l (g; ; R)=@g l if g < g sl . The proposition follows from the concavity of V s (g; ; L) and V l (g; ; R) in g.
Propositions 1, 3 and 4 yield the following conclusion. Consider a state s that is aligned and more swing than state l (i.e., 0
Then so long as equilibrium grants are "small", state s receives higher central grants than state l, regardless of the alignment of state l. We refer to this feature of the optimal grant allocation as the Aligned Swing E¤ ect.
Finally, note that if was endogenous and subject to manipulation by the central incumbent, then it would want to reveal information about the source of grants in unaligned states: hence, discretionary grants in unaligned states might be skewed in favor of grants that are "targeted" in the sense that it is clear to voters where the grants come from. Once is made endogenous, the role of state level incumbent politicians in trying to change cannot be ignored as well. We leave these extensions for future work. What we can say unambiguously is that if all grants are targeted (i.e., provide information regarding the source of the grant, = 1), then alignment does not matter and only swing states are favored. We refer to the exclusive importance of swing in determining the optimal allocation of targeted grants as the Swing E¤ ect for targeted grants. Proof If = 1, the two cut-point equations (1) and (2) are the same. Hence, the …rst order conditions, equations (6) and (7), are also the same for all states. The results from Proposition 2 therefore apply to all states regardless of alignment. 9 What this rules out is 
Extension of the benchmark model
Suppose now that the central incumbent has a di¤erent objective function: it seeks to maximize the chances of its own re-election at the central level. We assume that grants from the central incumbent cannot be given directly to the constituency level -even if grants are made by central ministries 10 , they can be targeted at particular constituencies only through the purpose of the grants (e.g., village road building would bene…t all rural constituencies which do not have roads but …ner partitions are not possible).
We assume also that voters vote on party lines at both central and state level elections. This means, in particular, that ideology of voters at the state level election is the same as at the central level election, and so is the distribution of ideology on the interval [X; X]: Hence, cut-points are determined exactly as before for each state: states that are relatively more swing at state level elections remain relatively more swing at central level elections. If the central incumbent has the same objective function i.e. to maximize its vote shares across states in the central level election, then we get the same predictions as in Propositions 1-5, but for central elections.
To summarize, when the objective function of the central government is to get re-elected through maximizing the vote shares across states and voters are assumed to vote on party lines, then the predictions of Propositions 1-5 still hold.
Institutional Details
In this section, we present some relevant facts about political institutions in India, outline the electoral history of political parties since independence in 1947, discuss the basic structure of center-state transfers, and provide examples of central government schemes …nanced by the central grant category on which our paper focuses.
Political Institutions

Electoral Rules
India has a parliamentary democracy at both the central and state levels. The central parliament, the Lok Sabha, has 543 members. The country is divided into 543 separate geographical areas (that is, Lok Sabha constituencies), each of which returns one Member of Parliament. The size and shape of the Lok Sabha constituencies are determined by an independent Delimitation Commission. The Commission ensures that Lok Sabha constituencies strictly respect state boundaries and, as near as is practicable, have the same population. This means, of course, that the number of Lok Sabha constituencies assigned to a state is in rough proportion to its population.
Given single-member constituencies, elections to the Lok Sabha use the …rst-past-thepost system: a voter in a speci…c constituency casts a vote for one of the candidates up for election in that constituency; the candidate mustering the most votes is declared the election winner. While most candidates stand as Independents (that is, without formal a¢ liation with any political party), successful candidates are usually representatives of recognized political parties. 11 State governments have their own parliament, the Vidhan Sabha, with assembly size depending on state population (Uttar Pradesh has 425 members and Haryana, 90). The procedures for Vidhan Sabha elections exactly mirror those for central elections. Each state is divided into single-member Vidhan Sabha constituencies (the boundaries of Vidhan and Lok Sabha constituencies are di¤erent) and the …rst-past-the-post system is used.
Government Formation
Once Lok Sabha election outcomes are declared and there is a single-party majority, the party with the largest number of seats is invited by the president of India to form the central government. When there is no clear majority, coalitions with su¢ ciently large support can form the government. The government that eventually forms, whether single-party or coalition, must command the con…dence of a majority of the Lok Sabha members.
The constitution of India mandates that a national legislative assembly have a normal term of …ve years from the date appointed for its …rst sitting. Hence, Lok Sabha elections must be held every …ve years, unless called earlier. Two circumstances lead to mid-term (that is, early) elections. First, a government may lose the con…dence of the Lok Sabha. The president of India, upon verifying that no claimant can form an alternative government claiming majority support, conventionally calls for fresh elections. Second, a government may, principally for electoral gains, voluntarily petition the president of India to dissolve the Lok Sabha and hold mid-term elections; by convention, such recommendations are consented to. For the period that we study (…nancial year 1974-75 to 1996-97), Lok Sabha elections took place in 1977, 1980, 1984, 1989, 1991 and 1996 .
The rules for government formation at the state level are identical to those at the center. Once Vidhan Sabha election outcomes are declared, the governor of the state invites the party with the largest number of seats to form the state government, which must command the support of a majority of the Vidhan Sabha members. The constitution of India stipulates that the normal term of a state legislative assembly is …ve years from the date appointed for its …rst sitting. Hence, Vidhan Sabha elections are normally held every …ve years, unless called earlier. 12 State elections were formally de-linked from central elections in 1969, when several states held mid-term elections.
Electoral History
The electoral history of India divides into two distinct phases. In the …rst phase, which spanned the years from independence in 1947 until 1967, the Congress Party monopolized the electoral landscape: indeed, in this period, the Congress Party never obtained less than 70 percent of the seats in any Lok Sabha election and won all but two Vidhan Sabha elections. 13 However the con ‡uence of several crises between 1962 and 1966 (two severe droughts, an unpopular currency devaluation, the death of party stalwarts such as Jawaharlal Nehru, and so on) ensured that the Lok and Vidhan Sabha elections of 1967 marked the beginning of a new phase in Indian politics: the Congress Party lost 78 seats in the Lok Sabha election and retained a majority of just 23 seats; subsequently in the Vidhan Sabha elections, nonCongress governments came to power in …ve states. The post-1967 era has beheld lively inter-party competition for seats at both the central and state levels.
Our theoretical model assumes that there are two parties: in reality of course India has many parties, some of which may di¤er at the state and central levels. However, for the period that we study, Table 1 shows that the Congress Party has been in power at the center except for three phases: 1977-1980 (when the Janata Party was in power), [1989] [1990] [1991] (when a coalition called the National Front was in power), and 1996-1997 (when a coalition called the United Front was in power). Adding up these three phases, the Congress Party was in power at the center for all but a total of 4 years and 2 months. In the main, state elections have witnessed two-party contests. For the period under review, the Congress Party was the dominant party, engaged in competition with di¤erent parties in di¤erent states.
Fiscal Structure of States and Center-State Transfers
We now brie ‡y outline relevant aspects of the …scal structure of state governments. The revenue receipts of a state government derive from three sources: tax revenues raised by the state government (e.g., through levying taxes on commodities), non-tax revenues raised by the state government (e.g., from state lotteries), and transfers from the center. There are three major channels through which the center transfers funds to state governments. These are (i) tax devolution and grants by the Finance Commission, (ii) grants by the Planning Commission, and (iii) transfers on account of various central plan and centrally sponsored schemes by various central ministries.
The constitution of India speci…es that the states are entitled to a share of the tax revenues collected by the center; the aggregate share as well as the distribution amongst the states is decided by Finance Commissions which are appointed at periodic intervals. Successive Finance Commissions recommend explicit formulas to determine the allocation of central tax revenues amongst states. While these Finance Commission awards have been criticized from time to time, it is generally agreed that the formulas are not in ‡uenced by political considerations. In addition to tax devolution, Finance Commissions are also required to recommend grants to the states in need of assistance under Article 275 of the constitution of India.
Category (ii): A sizeable proportion of central grants are also channelled through the Planning Commission. From 1969, plan transfers have been e¤ected on the basis of a formula decided by the National Development Council, which is chaired by the prime minister and contains all cabinet ministers at the center, chief ministers of the states, and members of the Planning Commission. Since grants on account of state plan schemes are based on this consensus formula, we exclude them from the category of discretionary grants to the states. 14 Category (iii): Central government ministries initiate a number of national programs (e.g., family planning) either by themselves or at the request of state level ministries. The speci…c purpose transfers given to states through central plan schemes and centrally sponsored schemes have attracted the sharpest criticism because these are essentially completely discretionary. 15 Central plan schemes are funded entirely by the center, the states merely exercising an agency role in executing these programs. Centrally sponsored programs involve some element of cost-sharing between the center and the concerned state.
Our empirical model only considers grants which come under category (iii), thus explicitly ignoring the general purpose and largely formula-based grants in categories (i) and (ii). 16 ' 17 This choice of the grant variable is dictated by two considerations. First, category (iii) grants are undoubtedly the most discretionary grants among those listed above. Second, category (iii) grants …t better with our theoretical model which has a central government unilaterally choosing grants rather than bargaining between the center and states.
Examples of Central Plan Scheme and Centrally Sponsored Scheme Grants
There are a large number of central plan and centrally sponsored schemes in place. Examples of such schemes can be seen from the websites of the respective ministries. The Ministry of Rural Development (http://rural.nic.in/) talks about a scheme called "Bharat Nirman" under which there are targets set down for electri…cation of villages, telephone connectivity, provision of clean water to villages, and so on. The Ministry of Power has the responsibility for the 1 4 Central assistance on account of state plan schemes has a large loan component as well. Central loans on account of state plan schemes augment a state's capital receipts. 1 5 In fact, Rao and Singh (2001) de…ne discretionary central grants to be those that exclusively …nance these two scheme types. 1 6 Central assistance on account of central plan and centrally sponsored schemes has a small loan component. We disregard this loan component in our empirical analysis since the loan rates are hardly subsidized. 1 7 We note that our paper complements Khemani (2007) , which focuses instead on central transfers under categories (i) and (ii). electri…cation plan through a program called "Rajiv Gandhi Vidyutikaran Yojana" and the agency for implementation is the Rural Electri…cation Corporation, a public sector agency, rather than the state government. On the other hand, for drinking water, the scheme is a centrally sponsored scheme where state governments contribute 50 percent of the funds and have a role in the targeting of bene…ciaries. Examples of other schemes under the Ministry of Rural Development include "Swarnajayanti Gram Swarozgar Yojana" (which provides bank …nance so that bene…ciaries can buy productive assets and be self-employed) and "Indira Aawas Yojna" (which provides houses to households below the poverty line).
The Data
The data set for our study consists of annual observations spanning the …nancial years 1974-75 to 1996-97 for the 14 major states of India. Thus, we exclude from our study the so-called special category states that receive exceptionally generous …nancial treatment from the Indian government on account of their speci…c problems (see Rao and Singh (2001) for further details) and the tiny state of Goa, which was upgraded from union territory status as recently as 1987. 18 In …nancial year 1996-97, the 14 major states accounted for 83.1 percent of India's land area, 93.3 percent of her population, and 92.6 percent of the domestic product. The details on sources of data and the method of construction of variables are provided in the Data Appendix.
The grant variable that we use is de…ned as the per capita sum of central plan scheme and centrally sponsored scheme grant levels in constant prices (1980-81 rupees). Column [1] of Table 2 provides state-speci…c means and standard deviations of this grant variable computed over the sample period. There is enormous across-state variation in the levels of per capita grants. For example, per capita grants average 115.61 rupees in Rajasthan (high) and 38.69 rupees in West Bengal (low).
The set of explanatory variables are partitioned into two distinct categories. The …rst category, referred to as political controls, measures political attributes of states that are likely to in ‡uence central grant awards. The second category, referred to as other controls, measures ostensibly non-political attributes of states (e.g., per capita state domestic product) that capture the need for central assistance.
Political Controls
There are four main predictions from our benchmark theoretical model: (i) Alignment E¤ect, (ii) Aligned Swing E¤ect, (iii) Unaligned Swing E¤ect, and (iv) Swing E¤ect for targeted grants. Prediction (i) says that when the fraction of goodwill received by the incumbent at the center, , is low, then independent of swing, an aligned state receives higher grants relative to an unaligned state. Prediction (ii) states that an aligned and swing state obtains higher grants relative to a non-swing state, whether aligned with the central incumbent or otherwise.
Prediction (iii) points out that if is high, then a state that is unaligned and swing receives higher grants relative to a state that is unaligned and non-swing. This conclusion is reversed when is low. We are unable to test predictions (i) and (iii) because they depend on the unobservable : Since data on targeted grants are not available, we are also unable to test prediction (iv). We discuss below how we translate prediction (ii) into empirically testable hypotheses.
Our political variables are Swing and Alignment. We construct both as dummy variables. The swing dummy is denoted SW : states are therefore categorized as 'swing' (SW equals one) or 'non-swing' (SW equals zero). The alignment dummy is denoted AL. Consider a linear regression model that includes the interacted regressors AL SW; AL (1 SW ) and (1 AL) SW and let , and be the corresponding coe¢ cients. Then, prediction (ii) implies that > 0 and > 0. In order to proceed with the construction of the two crucial dummy variables, AL and SW , we …rst assume that decisions regarding the allocation of central grants to state s for …nancial year t are made at the very beginning of that …nancial year (that is, March 31 of …nancial year (t 1)) using state electoral outcome information from the last Vidhan Sabha election as well as the last Lok Sabha election.
We opt for the March 31 decision date because by that time, the amount of aggregate central grants (on account of central plan schemes and centrally sponsored schemes) available for disbursement in the forthcoming …nancial year is formally recorded in the annual …scal budget of the central government and there is at least an implicit understanding in the Planning Commission regarding the grant amounts assigned to each of the states. This reasoning notwithstanding, the March 31 deadline is of course somewhat arbitrary. So, in Section 6 we report our results when the central grants-related decision date for …nancial year t is pegged instead at March 1 of …nancial year (t 1) (that is, we bring forward the decision date by one month).
We construct the alignment dummy as follows: AL st is de…ned as 1 if the central government and the state government of state s on March 31 of …nancial year (t 1) share at least one political party in common and there is no President's Rule in state s on that date. 19 ' 20 The state-speci…c averages for this variable are given in Column [2] of Table 2 The construction of the alignment dummy may give rise to some concern. Suppose that at the start of …nancial year t, the center and state s are governed by distinct coalitions that have only a minimal party in common. Yet, despite the plainly tenuous overlap between the two coalition governments, we code AL st to equal 1. Fortunately, such concerns are misplaced in the Indian context during the period under review. Between …nancial years 1974-75 and 1996-97, the central government was a coalition for a total of two years and …ve months. Averaged over the 14 states, coalition governments at the state level accounted for a total of one year and two months. 21 In most instances, all the parties of a state government coalition were either in power at the center or out of power at the center.
Consider, now, how we create the political control variables that indicate whether a stateyear (s; t) is swing or not. 22 We construct the swing dummy to satisfy the following criteria: First, it should be a relative measure in line with our theoretical model; and second, it should take account of multi-party contests that are a standard feature of constituency-level elections in India.
Our theoretical model shows that both Vidhan and Lok Sabha election outcomes may a¤ect the ‡ow of central funds. This means that we end up creating two sets of measures of swing for state-year (s; t) -one set is derived from Vidhan Sabha election outcomes while the other is based on Lok Sabha election outcomes -and include interactions between these two sets of swing measures in our empirical model. Consistent with the construction of the alignment dummy, the various swing measures for state-year (s; t) use outcomes from the last Vidhan and Lok Sabha elections as viewed from the decision date pegged at March 31 of …nancial year (t 1).
Our construction of the swing measures proceeds as follows. Given state-year (s; t), we identify the last Vidhan Sabha and Lok Sabha elections occurring in state s prior to …nancial year t. 23 Now, for both elections, we observe the vote shares of the contending political parties in each of the electoral constituencies of state s. So, for each election, we …rst de…ne a variable winmarg, which for electoral constituency i is the di¤erence in the percentage vote shares of the two political parties that secure the highest number of votes in constituency i (see footnote for further details); 24 this done, we classify electoral constituency i as a 'swing'constituency if its winmarg value is less than or equal to the cuto¤ value of one percent. Let vswing01 st and lswing01 st denote, respectively, the proportion of such swing constituencies in state s in the identi…ed Vidhan and Lok Sabha elections. Additionally, we create variables vswing02 st to vswing10 st and lswing02 st to lswing10 st as the proportion of constituencies in state s that have winmarg values less than or equal to two percent to 10 percent in the identi…ed Vidhan and Lok Sabha elections. These cuto¤ values capture the "tightness" of the race in a constituency when multiple parties (two or more) contest the election.
The state-speci…c means of eight 'proportion of swing constituencies'variables -that is, 2 1 For each state s, we computed the number of months between …nancial years 1974-75 and 1996-97 during which the state government was a coalition. The average of these numbers over the 14 states is 14 months.
2 2 Note that we use "state-year (s; t)" as a shorthand for "state-…nancial year (s; t)." 2 3 For concreteness, consider the …nancial year 1974-75. To obtain the swing measures, we identify the last Vidhan Sabha and Lok Sabha elections occurring before March 31, 1974. 2 4 Let there be K political parties contending a Vidhan Sabha election in electoral constituency i of state s. Let the votes received by party 1 be v1, the votes received by party 2 be v2, and so on. If party 1 is highest vote-getter in constituency i and party 2 is the second highest vote-getter in constituency i, then winmarg for constituency i in the Vidhan Sabha election under review is 100 (v1 v2)= P K j=1 vj. Ideally, we would like to use eligible voting population of constituency i as the denominator in the calculation of its winmarg value since there may be concerns regarding the possible endogeneity of the voter turnout variable. However, in the Indian context, we believe that this is unlikely to be a serious problem; Ghosh (2006) shows that electoral turnout in Lok Sabha constituencies is not robustly explained by the predicted closeness of the election. vswing01, vswing02, vswing05, vswing10, lswing01, lswing02, lswing05 and lswing10 -are provided in Panel [1] of Table 3 . Column [1] shows that over our sample period, in the states of Haryana, Kerala and Uttar Pradesh, over six percent of Vidhan Sabha constituencies witnessed elections in which the winning margin (that is, winmarg) was not more than one percent; in marked contrast, the corresponding numbers for the states of Gujarat and West Bengal are less than three percent. Column [2] raises the winning margin to two percent. Notice, now, that over our sample period, over 14 percent of Vidhan Sabha constituencies in Kerala witnessed elections wherein the winning margin was not more than two percent. Panel [1] highlights an important contrast between Vidhan and Lok Sabha elections. Since Vidhan Sabha elections primarily center on local issues, "small" political parties with narrow and localized support bases often contest Vidhan Sabha elections while opting out of Lok Sabha elections. The spreading of votes over a larger set of contending political parties makes the winning margin in Vidhan Sabha elections on average lower than that in Lok Sabha elections. This is best seen by considering the proportion of Vidhan and Lok Sabha swing constituencies averaged over the 14 states in our study: with the winning margin set at one percent, two percent, …ve percent and 10 percent, the proportions of Vidhan Sabha swing constituencies in the 14 states are, respectively, 0:046, 0:089, 0:220 and 0:411; the corresponding proportions for Lok Sabha elections, viz. 0:039, 0:079, 0:174 and 0:345, are uniformly lower.
Although the various 'proportion of swing constituencies' measures enable us to pick up the closeness of Vidhan and Lok Sabha elections in each state, the testing of our model predictions with these variables is not straightforward. Instead, our model testing is based on a set of swing dummies, each of which is derived from the corresponding 'proportion of swing constituencies' variable (vswing01 st is transformed to vswingdum01 st , lswing01 st is transformed to lswingdum01 st , and so on). The swing dummies are constructed as follows. Take, for example, the vswing01 variable which refers to Vidhan Sabha elections and uses the one percent cuto¤ value for the winning margin (that is, winmarg). For …nancial year t, we …rst calculate the median value of vswing01 st across all states s that have a positive vswing01 st . Let this median value be denoted med t . Given med t , we now let vswingdum01 st take the value of 1 (respectively, 0) if vswing01 st strictly exceeds (respectively, is weakly less than) med t . Notice that under our de…nition, 50 percent of the states with non-zero values of vswing01 in …nancial year t are classi…ed as swing states in that year.
The state-speci…c means of the eight swing dummies (two election types four cuto¤ values for the winning margin) are given in Panel [2] of Table 3 . Consider Column [1] of Panel [2] . With the winning margin set at one percent, the relevant swing dummies are vswingdum01 and lswingdum01. Now, focus on the state of Bihar. Column [1] indicates that out of the 23 sample years, Bihar was coded as a swing state on 17 occasions (0:739 23) using the variable vswingdum01 and coded as a swing state on eight occasions (0:348 23) using the variable lswingdum01. The results in Panel [2] are in conformity with widely held views regarding the political competitiveness of Indian states. With respect to Vidhan Sabha elections, the principal focus of our study, Panel [2] identi…es Bihar, Kerala and Uttar Pradesh as highly swing states. Vidhan Sabha elections in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh are multi-party contests and a small vote swing in favor of any one political party leads to vast changes in the seat shares of the contending parties. Vidhan Sabha elections in Kerala, on the other hand, have centered on two pre-poll alliances -one alliance is led by the Congress Party while the other is led by the Communist Party of India (Marxist). Over the years, the electoral margins have been razor thin and the two alliances have taken turns in forming the state government.
Other Controls
The set of 'other controls'comprises six regressors: annual rainfall, state population, proportion of state population characterized as scheduled caste or scheduled tribe, per capita state domestic product in constant prices (1980-81 rupees), the share of agriculture in state domestic product, and state's per capita allocation of the proceeds of central taxes, as determined by the Finance Commission, in constant prices (1980-81 rupees). 25 Summary statistics for these regressors are given in Column [3] to [8] of Table 2 .
We brie ‡y outline why we condition the allocation of central grants on the set of 'other controls'. State incomes derived from agriculture depend on rainfall levels; central grants may provide insurance to state governments by responding to rainfall shocks. Singh (1998, 2001) argue that state population per se is frequently a measure of political in ‡uence; central grants may therefore be disproportionately skewed towards populous states. Scheduled castes and scheduled tribes represent historically disadvantaged groupings of citizens; equity considerations could induce a positive relationship between grant awards and the share of such groups in states'population. Equity concerns also lead us to believe that poorer states will receive more of the central pie than richer states. Chakraborty (2003) , on the other hand, argues that state income is a good proxy for lobbying power. This suggests that central transfers in India may actually be regressive. Farmers and industrialists represent distinct lobbies with disparate interests. The strengths of these two groups play a role in determining whether industrial states are favored in terms of grant awards relative to agricultural states. Alternatively, public investments may have greater value in industrial states (e.g., because of higher population density). Here, economic e¢ ciency considerations could induce a negative relationship between the volume of central grants and the share of agriculture in state domestic product. Finally, why do we use the explicitly formula-based per capita allocation of central tax revenues as a regressor? It is generally agreed that the Finance Commission, which determines states'share of central tax revenues, does not exhibit noticeable political bias and instead bases its awards on variables that re ‡ect states' genuine need for central assistance. By using these Finance Commission transfers as a regressor, we ask whether the variables on which we focus -the swing and alignment dummies -account for central grants once we control for states'needs as perceived by the Finance Commission. 26 
Empirical Model and Results
In our theoretical model, the party in power at the center maximizes the objective function in equation (4) subject to an aggregate budget constraint. The maximization problem yields a behavioral function where the supply of central grants to a particular state depends on the exogenous characteristics of all states. Our empirical work does not estimate this behavioral function. Instead, we record the grants given by the central incumbent to the various states and ask the following question: Is there an association between the central grant awards and the political factors identi…ed by our theoretical model? To this end, we estimate the following log-linear model for grants:
where grants st is the per capita real grants (on account of central plan schemes and centrally sponsored schemes) from the center to state s in …nancial year t, p st is the vector of political controls, and x st is the vector of other explanatory variables. To account for unobserved state speci…c e¤ects, we include state speci…c dummies, s ; similarly, time speci…c dummies, t , are included to account for unobserved time speci…c e¤ects. The model is estimated using ordinary least squares. The resulting estimators are consistent provided the unobserved state speci…c and time speci…c e¤ects are su¢ cient to account for any possible correlation between the regressors and the error term. How are the 'political controls'in equation (13) constructed? In Section 4.1, we described an array of swing dummies (vswingdum01, lswingdum01, and so on), each of which was formed on the basis of either Vidhan or Lok Sabha election outcomes. From within this set of swing dummies, a speci…c empirical model …rst selects one swing dummy based on Vidhan Sabha election outcomes (call this V SW ) and one swing dummy based on Lok Sabha election outcomes (call this LSW ). This done, the 'political controls'include all relevant interactions between the alignment dummy, AL, and the two chosen swing dummies, V SW and LSW . For ease of discussion, we write the political e¤ects as follows:
Our basic empirical model selects vswingdum01 to be the Vidhan Sabha swing dummy, VSW, and lswingdum01 to be the Lok Sabha swing dummy, LSW, in equation (14) . 27 Column [2] of Table 4 reports the regression results for the basic model. 28 Five conclusions follow directly from these results.
First, we …nd that the only coe¢ cients that are signi…cantly di¤erent from zero are the coe¢ cients on (i) AL V SW LSW and (ii) AL V SW (1 LSW ). A state that is aligned and swing in both the last Vidhan Sabha and the last Lok Sabha elections is estimated to receive 19.6 percent (exp(0:179) 1) higher central grants than a state that is unaligned and non-swing with respect to both election types (the base case in our empirical model); an aligned state that is swing in the last Vidhan Sabha but non-swing in the last Lok Sabha election is estimated to receive 13.9 percent (exp(0:130) 1) higher central grants than a state that is unaligned and non-swing with respect to both election types.
Second, it turns out that the null hypothesis 1 2 = 0 is not rejected at conventional levels of signi…cance. 29 Consider, now, an aligned state for which the Vidhan Sabha swing dummy, V SW , assumes the value of one. With 1 equal to 2 , notice that central grants to this state are not conditioned on the value of the Lok Sabha swing dummy, LSW . Thus, our empirical …ndings highlight the key role of Vidhan Sabha election outcomes in determining central transfers. A possible explanation for this is that Vidhan Sabha elections feature many more candidates and are held far more frequently than Lok Sabha elections.
Third, consider a state that is aligned and swing in the last Vidhan Sabha election (the Lok Sabha swing dummy can be either zero or one). The coe¢ cients on the variables in Column [2] indicate that such a state receives higher central grants than a state that is unaligned, regardless of its swing characteristics (see footnote for details). 30 Fourth, consider a state that is aligned and swing in the last Vidhan Sabha election (the Lok Sabha swing dummy can be either zero or one). The coe¢ cients on the variables in Column [2] indicate that such a state receives higher central grants than a state that is aligned but non-swing, de…ned here as a state with V SW equal to zero (see footnote for details). 31 Fifth, conclusions three and four jointly imply that a state with AL and V SW equal to one is favored by the central incumbent relative to a non-swing state (V SW equal to zero), regardless of its alignment.
For comparison purposes, we also report the baseline regression without 'other (that is, non-political) controls'in Column [1] of Table 4 . Comparing Columns [1] and [2] , we see that the main coe¢ cient of interest, that on AL V SW LSW , remains positive and signi…cant when 'other controls'are excluded from the model. In summary, there is clear evidence of the Aligned Swing E¤ect emphasized in our theoretical model.
Robustness Issues
Section 6 consists of two parts. In the …rst part, we consider several variants of our basic model but do not tinker with the two swing dummies, VSW and LSW, used in the construction of the 'political controls'. In the second part, we study how the conclusions in Section 5 are a¤ected when the swing dummies are constructed somewhat di¤erently. 2 9 Our results show that (^ 1 ^ 2 ) is equal to 0.049 with a standard error of 0.054. 3 0 This conclusion follows since standard hypothesis tests establish: (i) 1 > 0; (ii) 2 > 0; and (iii) ( i j ) > 0, i = 1; 2 and j = 5; 6; 7.
3 1 This conclusion follows since standard hypothesis tests establish: (i) ( 1 3 ) and ( 1 4 ) exceed 0; and (ii) ( 2 3 ) and ( 2 4 ) exceed 0.
Variants of the Basic Model
Recall that our basic model has the following three features: …rst, we maintained that central grants-related decisions for …nancial year t are made on the basis of political considerations prevailing on March 31 of …nancial year (t 1); second, we included state's per capita allocation of central tax revenues, as determined by the Finance Commission, in our set of regressors; and third, the construction of the alignment dummy classi…ed a spell of President's Rule as a period of center-state nonalignment. Consider what happens to our results when these three features of the basic model are changed one at a time. Variant 1 of the basic model (Column [3] of Table 4 ) uses March 1 of …nancial year (t 1) as the date on which central grant allocations for …nancial year t are decided (see footnote for details). 32 Shifting the decision date by a month (from March 31 to March 1) leaves the conclusions of the basic model unaltered: as in Section 5, the coe¢ cients that are signi…cantly di¤erent from zero are the coe¢ cients on (i) AL V SW LSW and (ii) AL V SW (1 LSW ).
Variant 2 of the basic model (Column [4] of Table 4 ) excludes the Finance Commission transfers from the set of regressors. While the results in Column [4] are somewhat worse than those in Column [2] (the coe¢ cient on AL V SW (1 LSW ) is statistically signi…cant at only the 10 percent level and the model's R 2 goes down), the substantive implications of the two sets of results are broadly similar.
Variant 3 of the basic model (Column [5] of Table 4 ) constructs the alignment dummy by implicitly classifying a period of President's Rule as a spell of center-state alignment (see footnote for details). 33 This alteration in the treatment of President's Rule makes little di¤erence to the conclusions of the basic model: while the coe¢ cients in Column [5] are mostly larger than those in Column [2] , the same two variables are signi…cant in both cases.
Finally, in Variant 4 (Column [6] of Table 4 ), we re-estimate the basic model with 'political controls' consisting of three separate regressors: AL, vswing01 and lswing01. 34 Two conclusions follow from Column [6] estimates. First, the coe¢ cient on the alignment dummy is not statistically signi…cant from zero, implying that central grants are not conditioned per se on whether a state is aligned or not. The Core Support hypothesis (Cox and McCubbins (1986) , Case (2001) ) states that the central government uses grants to reward its core support: in Case (2001) this is tested empirically using the proportion of voters in a constituency that vote for the leading party in the national election. Observe that the central incumbent's vote share in the state election (Case's core support measure) and the alignment dummy are positively correlated so that ceteris paribus, aligned states have higher core support than un-aligned states. Hence, one test of the Core Support hypothesis would be that alignment (by itself) matters for grants. Our …rst conclusion therefore suggests that there is no evidence for the Core Support hypothesis. 35 Second, the coe¢ cient on vswing01 is positive and signi…-cantly di¤erent from zero. So, an increase in the proportion of swing constituencies in the last Vidhan Sabha election increases the central grants received by a state.
Varying the Cuto¤ Value
The results in Section 5 show that Lok Sabha election outcomes do not impact central transfers. So, we re-estimate the basic model given in Column [2] of Table 4 without the Lok Sabha swing dummy, LSW . Column [1] of Table 5 provides the regression estimates.
Before discussing these estimates, we observe that the 'political controls'of our empirical model now consists of three interacted variables: AL V SW , AL (1 V SW ) and (1 AL) V SW . Let 1 ; 2 and 3 denote, respectively, the coe¢ cients on AL V SW; AL (1 V SW ) and (1 AL) V SW . Two main conclusions follow from Column [1] estimates. First, we note that the only coe¢ cient that is signi…cantly di¤erent from zero is the coe¢ cients on AL V SW . A state that is both aligned and swing in the last Vidhan Sabha election is estimated to receive 16 percent (exp(0:148) 1) higher grants than a state that is unaligned and non-swing in the last Vidhan Sabha election (the base case in our empirical model). Second, it turns out that ( 1 2 ) is positive and signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. This means that within the set of aligned states, states that are swing in the last Vidhan Sabha election receive higher central grants than states that are non-swing in the last Vidhan Sabha election. The two above conclusions jointly imply that an aligned and swing state is favored by the central incumbent relative to a state that is non-swing, regardless of its alignment. Summing up, the evidence suggests that the allocation of central transfers in India satis…es the Aligned Swing E¤ect property of our theoretical model.
Finally, we consider how our …ndings change as we vary the construction of the Vidhan Sabha swing dummy, V SW . Columns [2] to [4] of Table 5 report the regression results when the Vidhan Sabha swing dummy is, respectively, vswingdum02, vswingdum05 and vswingdum10. 36 The results in Table 5 show that when the cuto¤ value for the winning margin, used to decide whether a constituency is 'swing' or not, is raised from one percent, the coe¢ cient on AL V SW remains positive in sign; however, statistical signi…cance is lost. This suggests that only Vidhan Sabha constituencies witnessing especially close elections a¤ect grant allocations of the central incumbent.
Conclusion
This paper constructs a model of redistributive politics where the central government is opportunistic and uses its discretion to make grants to state governments on the basis of political considerations. These considerations are the alignment between the incumbent parties at the central and state levels and whether a state is a swing state or not. The main testable prediction from the model is that a state that is both swing and aligned with the central government receives higher grants relative to a state that is non-swing, whether aligned with the central government or otherwise. We test this prediction using Indian data for 14 states from 1974-75 to 1996-97. We …nd that a state which is both aligned and swing in the last state election is estimated to receive 16 percent higher grants than a state which is unaligned and non-swing.
Many empirical questions remain to be explored. Our study is con…ned to the analysis of explicit center-state transfers in India. Yet, intergovernmental transfers in India are frequently implicit (e.g., subsidized borrowing by states from the central government). A future study could estimate the extent to which political factors account for such transfers. Biswas and Marjit (2000) represent a start on this problem. They show that states'representation in the central government cabinet a¤ects the statewise distribution of industrial licenses.
Finally, we have tested but one half of the complete story. Speci…cally, while central governments' grant decisions were analyzed, voter behavior was left unaddressed. Does the electorate, at the sub-national level, condition its vote on central grants? Some evidence, employing US data, already exists. Levitt and Snyder (1997) demonstrate that central spending in a House district enhances the vote share of the incumbent member of Congress. Stein and Bickers (1994) use survey data to establish that a voter is more likely to support the incumbent House candidate when she is aware of new central grant awards to her district. Comparable work with Indian data is non-existent. In sum, the analysis of voter behavior in India remains a fruitful research topic.
Data Appendix
The data used in the paper come from a variety of sources. They cover the 14 major states of India and span the …nancial years 1974-75 to 1996-97.
Center-State Transfer Variables
Transfers from the center to the states (various categories) are measured per capita in constant prices (1980-81 rupees). Three categories of central transfers are considered: the allocation of the proceeds of the central taxes as determined by the Finance Commission, grants on account of central plan schemes, and grants on account of centrally sponsored schemes. The nominal transfer data from the center to the states (various categories) are from the Reserve Bank of India Bulletin, an annual publication of the Reserve Bank of India. The nominal transfer data are de ‡ated using the implicit state domestic product de ‡ator (base year 1980-81), obtained from the National Accounts Statistics (Government of India, Ministry of Planning, Department of Statistics). The state population data, used to express magnitudes in per capita terms, are obtained from the National Accounts Statistics.
Political Control Variables
The center-state alignment dummy was coded from Butler et al (1996) and Grover and Arora (1998). The Vidhan Sabha swing dummy and the Lok Sabha swing dummy were coded, respectively, from Vidhan Sabha and Lok Sabha constituency-level electoral data, downloaded from the website of the Election Commission of India (http://eci.gov.in).
Other Control Variables
The 'other' control variables are: (i) annual rainfall, (ii) per capita state domestic product in constant prices (1980- Fix a state-financial year. AL takes the value of 1 if the central and state governments on a specified date (March 1 of the previous financial year in Column [3] and March 31 of the previous financial year in Columns [1] , [2] , [4] , [5] and [6] ) share at least one political party in common; the treatment of President's Rule in the construction of AL is given in the final row of Table 4 .
The absolute t-ratios given in parentheses are based on robust standard errors that correct for clustering at the state level. State 1974 State 1975 State 1976 State 1977 State 1978 State 1979 State 1980 State 1981 State 1982 State 1983 State 1984 State 1985 State 1986 State 1987 State 1988 State 1989 State 1990 State 1991 State 1992 State 1993 State 1994 State 1995 (iii) Fix a state-financial year. VS (LS) takes the value of 1 if Vidhan Sabha (Lok Sabha) election outcomes result in the state being classified as a swing state in the given financial year. A state is defined as a swing state if the proportion of constituencies in the state that are swing (winning margin less than or equal to one percent) is greater than the median value for the proportion taken over all states in the given financial year.
(iv)
MP (see the column showing state names) refers to Madhya Pradesh; UP refers to Uttar Pradesh.
